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Abstract. A new generation of integrated assessment models of climate change
policies is needed to capture the basic dynamical processes that govern the re-
quired transformation of the present fossil-based global economic system to a
sustainable decarbonized system. After an overview of the abatement technolo-
gies and policy instruments that are already available and able today to achieve
the transformation, three examples are presented of typical actor-based, system-
dynamical models that are able to simulate some of the key dynamics of the transi-
tion processes. In addition to developing a new hierarchy of integrated assessment
models, scientists need also to better educate the public and policy makers on the
wide-reaching implications of the inherent inertia of the climate system.
1 Introduction: The role of science
The reality of human induced climate change is no longer seriously disputed. With the presen-
tation of the latest (Fourth) Assessment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) [15], highlighted by the joint award of the Nobel Peace Prize to IPCC and to
Al Gore for his widely acclaimed climate documentary ﬁlm “An incovenient truth”, and with
the publication in the same year of the forceful Review on the Economics of Climate Change
by Sir Nicholas Stern [24], the former chief economist of the World Bank, the need to jointly
address the challenge of climate change has become a high priority issue for all nations.
Science has played a crucial role in bringing the problem of climate change to the attention
of the media, the public and policy makers. Scientists have been warning of the dangers of global
warming caused by continually rising emissions of greenhouse gases, predominantly CO2, since
the early 1970’s. However, it was only with the creation of an oﬃcial UN Panel, the IPCC,
that the voice of science was widely listened to. The ﬁrst IPCC report in 1990 already had a
strong impact on the ﬁrst Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (the UN Conference on the
Environment and Development, UNCED), and the subsequent IPCC reports have continually
increased the public awareness of climate change.
The scientiﬁc basis of climate change has been disseminated to the wider public and pol-
icy makers primarily through the reports of IPCC Working Group 1 (“The science of Climate
Change”). In contrast, the reports of the remaining two IPCC Working Groups (WG 2, “Im-
pacts and Adaptation”, and WG 3, “Climate Change Mitigation”) have had little inﬂuence,
both on the public and, more importantly, on climate policies. In part, this is due to the long,
typically six-year intervals between successive IPCC reports, which are not in tune with the
shorter time scales of policy makers actively engaged in climate negotiations. But, on a more
fundamental level, the weak impact must also be attributed to basic shortcomings of the so
called integrated assessment models that have been used to analyse climate policies. These have
been largely based on general equilibrium models of the economy, or close derivatives thereof.
The concept of general equilibrium, although useful in many other areas of economics, fails
to capture the dynamical processes that govern the transformation from a fossil-based to a
decarbonized economic system [3,11].
In this paper, an overview is given of a proposed new generation of integrated assess-
ment models designed to overcome these shortcomings. The paper is structured as follows.
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As background, an overview is given in Section 2 of the available energy technologies and
climate policy instruments that can be applied already today to prevent dangerous global warm-
ing, normally deﬁned as a temperature increase of no more than 2◦C above the pre-industrial
level. Section 3 then addresses the question of why traditional integrated assessment models
have failed to capture the basic dynamics of the decarbonization transformation. It is argued
that economic thinking in general has been undergoing a paradigm shift from models rooted
in formal mathematical analysis, including, in particular the general equilibrium concept, to
dynamical simulation models that represent the economy as an evolving system governed by the
behaviour of individual economic actors pursuing diﬀerent economic goals. The paradigm shift
has inﬂuenced many areas of economics, but is only just beginning to penetrate the integrated
assessment modeling of climate change.
Examples of some simple dynamical multi-actor models are presented in the subsequent
sections 4–6. In view of the great complexity of the coupled climate-socio-economic system,
a single model will never be able to address all issues faced by policy makers. The modeling
challenge is rather to create a hierarchy of transparent, mutually supporting models that can be
readily understood by policy makers. The models presented span both the long term economic
evolution characterizing the transition to a decarbonized economy and shorter term instabili-
ties, such as business cycles, ﬁnancial crises and recessions, that policy makers strive to control
at the same time as avoiding dangerous climate change. The model examples are intended as
initial contributions to a planned more complete model hierarchy. Some general conclusions are
summarized in Section 7.
2 Abatement technologies and climate policy instruments
There exists general agreement that the technologies needed to decarbonize the global economy
exist already today. At present, most of these are still more expensive than fossil fuels, but the
cost relations are inverted if the damage costs of future climate change are properly internalized.
Moreover, the present costs of renewable energy are expected to fall through the economies of
scale and learning-by-doing once the technologies are implemented on the necessary global scale.
Most estimates of the direct costs of decarbonization lie in the range from −1% to 4% of
world GDP, with a mean value of about 1% [24]. Although this appears large when expressed in
dollars or Euros, when viewed over a period of many decades to centuries relevant for climate
change, and against the background of a global economy that can be expected to grow at a rate
of at least 1–2% per annum, it translates into a delay in economic growth over this period of
only a few months to a year [2,10]. This is clearly an acceptable price for avoiding the major
risks of dangerous long-term climate change.
The central issue is therefore not whether climate change mitigation is feasible or aﬀordable,
but how can it best be implemented: which decarbonization technologies are most promising,
in which time frame, and which policy instruments should be applied? The follow-up question
(pursued in the next sections) is then: how can science assist policy makers in this decision
process?
Figure 1 shows a plausible sequence of decarbonization technologies that could close the
wedge between the CO2 emission curve for a typical Business as Usual (BAU) reference scenario
and the sustainable-emissions curve required to avoid dangerous climate change [15].1
Many investigations have shown that the most economical method for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions is to increase energy eﬃciency. This can be achieved at near zero or even neg-
ative cost, and is therefore assumed to be implemented ﬁrst. However, since energy use and
the associated CO2 emissions can not be avoided entirely, but can only be reduced by a ﬁnite
factor, in the long term enhanced energy eﬃciency is unable to counteract the continual growth
of emissions, which is driven mainly by the legitimate welfare aspirations of the developing
countries.
1 For simplicity, the discussion is limited to the greenhouse gas CO2, which accounts for about 60%
of present greenhouse gas emissions, and is projected to contribute a still larger fraction in the future.
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Fig. 1. Closing the wedge between Business as Usual (BAU) emissions and the corresponding curve
for sustainable low-carbon emissions. Shown is a plausible scenario for the successive introduction of
technologically feasible abatement technologies (enhanced energy eﬃciency, CO2 sinks through refor-
estation, biomass-, wind-, hydro-, geothermal and solar energy) dependent on abatement capacities
and estimated short and long term costs.
In parallel, but with some delay, the lower-cost renewable energy technologies are then as-
sumed to penetrate the market. However, these technologies – CO2 sinks through reforestation,
2
biomass, wind energy, geothermal and hydro-power – also have only ﬁnite abatement capacities
and are therefore similarly unable to satisfy the growing long-term energy needs of the world’s
population. In the long-term, these can be satisﬁed only by exploiting solar energy, a virtu-
ally unlimited energy source.3 An area of about 200 km × 200 km in the world’s deserts could
provide suﬃcient energy to satisfy the world’s energy demand in the foreseeable future. How-
ever, the present costs for the large-scale introduction of concentrated solar power, including
the necessary infra-structure in the form of high-voltage direct-current grids, storage back-up,
computerized control of energy use, etc, are higher than the costs of other renewable energy
technologies. Thus solar energy will require subsidies to penetrate the market. The central pol-
icy problem is then choosing and implementing the proper mix of policy instruments to achieve
an optimal balance between shorter-term investments in low-cost renewable technologies and
longer-term investments in solar energy.
Governments have available four basic policy instruments to guide investments in the desired
direction:
1. Internalization of the future damage costs of climate change through the imposition of
a price on CO2 emissions, either directly through a carbon tax or indirectly through an
emission-permits trading (cap-and-trade) scheme (“stick” policies).
2 Although much discussed, reforestation has only a limited long-term impact, as indicated in Fig. 1,
since the net CO2 uptake vanishes once the forests are grown.
3 Other technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, advanced nuclear energy, or fusion, are
either unproven, or controversial, and will not be discussed in this brief overview.
40 The European Physical Journal Special Topics
Fig. 2. Replacement of fossil fuels (left) by low and high cost renewables (centre and right, respectively)
through application of stick and carrot policies (carbon price and subsidies). Blue columns: basic energy
production costs; red columns: future climate damage costs. Low-cost renewables become competitive
alone through stick policies (internalization of climate damage costs) while high-cost renewables require
in addition carrot policies (subsidies) to penetrate the market and exploit cost reductions through
economies of scale and learning-by-doing.
2. Subsidies for technologies (such as concentrated solar power) that are not yet competitive in
the market place, even with the introduction of a moderate carbon price, but are nevertheless
needed in the longer term (“carrot policies”).
3. Emission regulations for sectors that are not exposed to or are not suﬃciently responsive
to market forces (e.g. automobile emissions, building insulation, lighting, household appli-
ances, ..)
4. Financial and technological transfers from developed countries with high per capita emis-
sions to emerging and developing countries with low per capita emissions, for example,
through the allocation of equal per capita emission rights to all countries in a global cap-
and-trade scheme (thereby generating income for countries with low per-capita emissions
through the sale of initially surplus emission rights to countries with higher per-capita
emissions).
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of a combination of the ﬁrst two policy instruments, carbon prices
and subsidies. A carbon price “stick”, as implemented in the Kyoto cap-and-trade scheme,4
internalizes the external climate damage costs of fossil fuels. This shifts part of the future costs
of climate change to the present costs of fossil fuels (red arrow in Fig. 2), enabling lower-cost
renewable energy technologies to become competitive. However, higher-cost energy technologies,
such as solar energy, remain uncompetitive unless supported additionally by subsidies (“carrot”
policies, indicated by the second red arrow in Fig. 2). Although occasionally (inappropriately)
criticized as distorting the market, subsidies are essential societal investments that are justiﬁed
economically by the longer-term time horizons of public investments (low discount factors) as
opposed to the shorter-term horizons of private investments (high discount factors).
Unfortunately, not all sectors of the economy are suﬃciently exposed to market forces to
respond to market instruments. For example, aﬄuent automobile owners may be unwilling to
switch to low-fuel vehicles to avoid the higher fuel costs imposed by a carbon tax. Similarly,
limited economic incentives or information barriers hinder the wide-spread voluntary introduc-
tion of eﬃcient household appliances, low-energy light bulbs, building insulation, etc. In these
4 Unfortunately, the Kyoto emission trading scheme was largely ineﬀective, as too many permits were
allocated, and these were furthermore distributed free of charge instead of auctioned.
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Fig. 3. Estimated linearly extrapolated BAU per capita CO2 emissions, in tonnes carbon per year
(TC/yr), for industrialized and emerging countries, together with the convergence-and-contraction
emission curves required to achieve a sustainable long-term low-carbon economy.
cases, appropriate regulations are needed, and have proven to be eﬀective without imposing
signiﬁcant hardships.
Figure 3, ﬁnally, illustrates the need to augment national abatement policies with inter-
national agreements on ﬁnancial and technological transfers from high to low per-capita
emission countries. Shown as examples are per-capita CO2 emission curves for the industrial
countries USA and EU+Japan and the emerging economies China and India. The linearly grow-
ing emission curves correspond to plausible BAU scenarios, while the downwards turning curves
represent the emissions needed to arrive at a low-carbon global economy. The curves clearly
demonstrate that to reduce global emissions to levels consistent with the global sustainability
trajectory of Fig. 1, the industrial countries will need to reduce emissions much more strongly
than the emerging – or still more so, the developing – countries. Moreover, the curves indicate
that the emerging and developing countries will need to reduce emissions signiﬁcantly even be-
fore the per capita emissions of all countries have signiﬁcantly converged. This will presumably
be acceptable to countries whose per-capita emissions are still signiﬁcantly lower than those of
the industrialized countries only if the latter are willing to support the abatement eﬀorts of the
emerging and developing countries with major transfers of capital and technology.
3 The paradigm shift in economic theory
As already mentioned, the focus on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models in most
integrated assessments of climate policies fails to address many of the major concerns of policy
makers. While important aspects such as trade and price formation are well represented by
CGE models, other important issues are not. In particular, the impact of climate policies
on the many dynamical adjustment processes accompanying globalization cannot be captured
from an equilibrium perspective. For example, the immigration pressures and conﬂict potentials
arising from increasing rich-poor inequalities between developed und developing countries are
a major problem already today, and are expected to be further exacerbated by climate change.
Also excluded in CGE models, but central for policy makers, is the inter-relation between long-
term climate policies and short-term monetary and ﬁscal policies designed to stabilize ﬁnancial
markets and economic growth – as highlighted by the major global ﬁnancial crisis and recession
of 2008.
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The origin of this disconnect must be sought in the history of macroeconomics. Traditional
macroeconomics has been built on two basic pillars: the mental models of classical economists,
and formal mathematical analysis. Our present understanding of how the economy works is
still strongly anchored in the mental models developed by a formidable succession of economic
thinkers, beginning with Francois Quesnay and Adam Smith in the 18th century, and contin-
uing with David Ricardo, Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter and Milton
Friedman into the late twentieth century, to name but a few. Attempts to underlay or extend
these concepts, beyond explanatory graphs, with rigorous mathematical analysis, beginning in
the late 19th century, led then to an equally impressive series of theoretical constructs, from
general economic equilibrium theory – the centrepiece of mathematical macroeconomics cre-
ated by Walras (1874) [26] – to econometrics and statistical inference, the theory of economic
growth, and game theory.
However, it has always been recognized that the enormously complex macroeconomic sys-
tem, governed by the multiple interactions of innumerable, notoriously unpredictable human
agents, can be made amenable to formal mathematical analysis only by introducing highly
restrictive simpliﬁcations. These have often been motivated more by the desire to arrive at
analytically manageable (preferably conceptually elegant) mathematical structures, rather than
the wish to accurately translate the mental models of the classical economists into mathemat-
ical formalisms. Thus the relation between the mental models of the classical economists and
formal mathematical analysis has always been rather tenuous and controversial.
This is particularly pronounced for the general theory of economic equilibrium. Whereas
general equilibrium theory postulates a balance between supply and demand, yielding an eco-
nomic growth path corresponding to an optimal allocation of resources, with full employment,
near-zero proﬁts and optimal investments in capital, the mental models of most classical econo-
mists have been concerned with deviations from this ideal state, focussing on the diﬀerent roles
and conﬂicting economic goals of diﬀerent actors, the causes of unemployment, distributional
inequalities with associated potential for social strife, and instabilities such as business cycles,
recessions, ﬁnancial crises, etc.
The diﬀerent viewpoints correspond to the diﬀerent roles played by the economic actors
in the two classes of model. In general equilibrium theory, all economic actors are assumed
to have perfect knowledge and foresight, thereby behaving as universally predictable system
components. Thus the theory is in eﬀect actor independent. In contrast, classical mental models
are strongly anchored in human behaviour, diﬀerent models being distinguished by the diﬀerent
behavioral patterns assumed for diﬀerent economic actors.5
With the advent of increasingly powerful computers, however, many of the technical diﬃcul-
ties hindering the translation of classical mental models into mathematics amenable to formal
analysis could be simply side-stepped by direct computer simulation. This has motivated a
plethora of new approaches, beginning with the world model developed in the ground breaking
simulations of the Club of Rome [18]. Many of the later models fall within the general class
of multi-agent simulations, referred to variously as agent-based computational economics [25],
multi-agent systems [1,8], or, in a more general context, evolutionary economics [19], complexity
economics [4], post-Walrasian economics [5] or simply system dynamics [22].
The common goal of most of these multi-agent approaches is to derive the characteristic
features of macroeconomic systems as “emergent properties” of microeconomic systems gov-
erned by the interactions between (typically a large number of) individual agents. The simu-
lations have been successful in explaining many of the interesting and often puzzling features
of macroeconomic systems, such as the large volatilities, non-Gaussian ﬂuctuation statistics,
unanticipated major instabilities, or the emergence of complex networks of interacting agents.
However, apart from a few exceptions (e.g. [6,20]), the bottom-up approach has not yet yielded
macroeconomic models that can be usefully applied for policy advice, particularly with respect
5 Even Adam Smith [21], whose famous “invisible hand” is widely invoked as justiﬁcation for the
general equilibrium concept, argued that economic growth is driven by the technological innovative
eﬀorts of individual entrepreneurs striving to escape the erosion of proﬁts by competitors, rather than
the savings of consumers made available for business investments, as assumed in most general equilib-
rium models.
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to climate change. For lack of an alternative, most integrated assessments of climate change
have accordingly been carried out using available general equilibrium models, although the
limitations of these models are now well known (cf. [3,7]).
We argue that the route to agent-based macroeconomic models need not necessarily follow
the rather tedious path from high to low resolution. System reduction is routinely achieved in
physics and other ﬁelds by introducing heuristic assumptions, which can then be tested against
data and, if feasible, a few selected high resolution simulations. In fact, most mental models of
the classical economists use a heuristic approach. In accordance with this view, we present in
the following sections three simple examples of agent-based models deﬁned from the start as
top-down models. The dynamics of these models are governed by the actions of a small number
of representative economic actors. The approach leads to transparent models that can readily
communicated to policy makers and stakeholders. We prefer to use the term actor rather than
agent, as in contrast to the frequent use of the term agent as an arbitrary entity in a model that
can interact with other entities, as in an object-oriented program (cf. [25]), our agents refer to
real people pursuing individual economic goals.
Our modeling approach is hierarchial. The global climate-socioeconomic system in its en-
tirety is clearly far too complex to be described adequately by a single model. Our strategy
is accordingly to decompose the complete system into a set of sub-systems that highlight par-
ticular aspects of the complete system. The sub-system models are designed such that several
simple models can be combined into a more complex integrated model, or, alternatively, simple
models can be upgraded into more complex models by including further processes. In either
approach, the complexity of the resultant model is limited ultimately by the availability of data
to test the model. By adopting a hierarchial strategy, one can check at each model level whether
the model still lies within the testability limits.
Our model examples represent components of a more complete model hierarchy MADIAMS
(Multi-Actor Dynamic Integrated Assessment Model System) currently in development. The
ﬁrst model corresponds to the original coupled climate-socioeconomic model MADIAM of
Weber et al. [27]. MADIAM consists of a representative-actor macroeconomic model cou-
pled to a nonlinear impulse response sub-system model of the climate-carbon-cycle sys-
tem [13]. Our second model extends MADIAM by including shorter-term actor behaviour
that can lead to instabilities, such as business cycles or assett-market bubbles. This is
important for the assessment of climate policies applied to a global economic system that
has a demonstrated susceptibility to major instabilities and breakdowns. The third model, ﬁ-
nally, generalizes both models through the introduction of further actors engaged in the long
chain of processes extending from the initial generation and transmission of scientiﬁc infor-
mation on climate change through IPCC to the ﬁnal impact of the implemented policies on
climate change. An eﬀective scientiﬁc assessment of mitigation policies needs to be based on
an adequate understanding of the many delays and hindrances encountered in this complete
end-to-end process chain.
4 The MADIAM model
MADIAM combines a traditional macroeconomic model representation in terms of a standard
state vector x = (x1, x2, . . .) = (xj) of aggregated economic variables with a dynamical rep-
resentation of the evolution of the system that depends on the actions of a small number of
representative agents, characterized by a set of actor control variables z = (z1, z2, . . .) = (zj).
The evolution of the system is accordingly described by a set of coupled diﬀerential equations
dx
dt
= F(x, z) (1)
in which the individual control variables zj(t) at time t are functions of the present and past
values of the state vector and can also depend (in the case of more sophisticated inter-actor
strategies) on past values of the control variables. The control variables represent parameters in
a set of control algorithms describing either the strategies of individual actors (for example, with
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respect to the investment decisions of ﬁrms) or the outcome of negotiations between diﬀerent
actors (for example, in the determination of wage levels).
The actors correspond to the representative actors of standard economics, namely:
ﬁrms, which decide on investments and (in cooperation with workers) on wage levels; house-
holds, which decide on consumption, savings and (in their role as workers) on wage levels;
governments, which decide on the level and recycling of carbon taxes; and banks, which control
the money supply.
As state variables we choose again the standard variables of economic growth models: phys-
ical capital (sub-divided into fossil energy, non-fossil energy, and non-energy related physical
capital), human capital (representing the net sum of education, technological know-how, institu-
tions, ..), and consumer goods and services (sub-divided into climate-friendly and non-climate-
friendly goods). The production function is similarly represented in the traditional manner as
a function of physical capital, human capital, employed labor and available natural resources.
However, in contrast to most growth models, physical capital and labor are not treated
as substitutable. Instead, following Leontief [16], it is assumed that the level of technology
(human capital) determines the amount of labour that can be economically employed for a
given level of capital. This has two important consequences: ﬁrst, it implies that economic
growth is driven by investments in technology (as argued already by Adam Smith); second, if
employment and wage levels are high, ﬁrms are motivated to invest in human capital rather than
physical capital, resulting in higher labor productivity but lower employment levels. Ultimately,
a growth path is established in which investments in physical and human capital are balanced
at a ﬁnite level of structural unemployment, dependent, among other factors, on the outcome
of wage negotiations. These are rather common-sense conclusions which cannot be captured
and quantiﬁed, however, in the traditional actor-independent treatment of economic growth.
We refer to Weber et al. [27] for a more detailed analysis of the impact of various actor
strategies on economic growth under diﬀerent climate policies. Important for the outcome are
not only the investment decisions of ﬁrms, but also consumer preferences for climate-friendly
goods over non-climate-friendly goods, and the fraction of carbon taxes recycled into subsidies
for renewable energy technologies. Figure 4 shows as example the impact on climate-related
variables and various economic parameters of a carbon tax with and without recycling into
subsidies for renewable energies. The principal results are summarized in Fig. 5, which under-
lines the comment made earlier that dangerous change can be avoided through appropriate
climate polices (in this case a recycled carbon tax) at an acceptable price of only a minor delay
in long-term economic growth.
MADIAM has a number of limitations. In particular, it is restricted to a single economic
region (the world, or a single country), and short-term instabilities have been ﬁltered out. It is
planned to overcome both restrictions in higher model levels. In the following section we describe
the model modiﬁcations needed to simulate instabilities such as business cycles, recessions and
ﬁnancial crises.
5 Simulation of economic instabilities
Economic instabilities were ﬁltered out in the basic MADIAM version of Weber et al. [27]
through the assumption that the market for consumer goods and services (denoted in the fol-
lowing simply as consumer goods) was cleared: all consumer goods were assumed to be bought
and consumed at the same rate as they were produced, so that the stock of consumer goods
remained constant (and could be ignored as a variable). The only stock variables in which the
rate of production was not balanced by an equally large loss rate were physical capital (in its
various forms) and human capital. By dropping this assumption and treating consumer goods
also as a stock variable, one obtains a model that can develop various forms of actor-dependent
instabilities. Although well known and extensively treated in the economic literature, these
contradict the classical “invisible hand” hypothesis of economic equilibrium theory, which as-
sumes that any imbalances between supply and demand are automatically counteracted by the
response of the economic actors and removed.
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Fig. 4. Impact on climate and economic parameters of a carbon tax (moderate mitigation policy, MM)
and a carbon tax recycled into subsidies for renewable energies (induced technological change, ITC).
BAU (business as usual) curves are shown for comparison.
Fig. 5. Impact of weak, moderate and strong mitigation policies on CO2 emissions (left panel) and
economic production (right panel), compared against the business-as-usual scenario (BAU).











Fig. 6. Left panel: business cycle model of feedbacks between modiﬁcations of consumption (delcons),
production (dely) and wage levels (delw). Hour glasses denote rates of change (ﬂows), boxes inte-
grated variables (stocks), blue and red lines represent positive and negative feedbacks, respectively.
The variables fac1, . . ., fac3 denote feedback coeﬃcients which control whether the instabilities lead
to oscillations or exponential decay or growth. Right panel: a resulting oscillation, in normalized units
(delcons: blue; dely: red: delw: green.
Figure 6 shows as example a model of a business cycle resulting from unstable interactions
between ﬁrms and households. The left panel shows the feedbacks associated with a slow-down
in production (dely) by ﬁrms responding to a decrease in household consumption (delcons)
(triggered, for example, by some random external event). The reduced production, associated
with lay-oﬀs, etc, induces a decrease in consumer conﬁdence and thereby a further reduction in
consumption. This positive feedback loop in itself (top two boxes) would produce an unstable
exponential collapse of production and consumption: a recession (or, alternatively, a boom,
depending on the initial conditions). However, for a suitable choice of feedback factors, the in-
stability is converted into a periodic cycle through a stabilizing negative feedback loop (bottom
two boxes), representing in this case the willingness of ﬁrms to employ more labor once wages
have been suﬃciently depressed by the reduced employment level.
There exist, of course, many alternative models of business cycles and recessions (e.g. [14,17];
however, common to most models is the positive feedback loop of the top two boxes of Fig. 6).
It is important to include these various hypotheses of actor behaviour explicitly in the model
in order to study their impact on other model properties, in particular, on the eﬀectiveness of
longer-term climate mitigation policies. In the present case, for example, the representation of
consumer goods as a stock variable not only enabled the generation of business cycles and other
short-term instabilities (see next example), but also modiﬁed the long-term economic growth
paths. These were found to depend now on the longer-term supply-response strategies of ﬁrms
to longer-term changes in the demand for consumer goods – a degree of freedom which was
surpressed in the previous market-clearing treatment of consumer goods [9,12].
Common to most forms of instabilities are self-fulﬁlling actor prophesies of future price
evolution. Classical example are bubbles and busts in assett and housing markets, which trig-
gered the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. This is in conﬂict with standard economic theory, which
states that supply and demand of a given good always stabilize through market feedbacks to
an equilibrium price. If the price is inceased, demand decreases, and vice versa, while supply
adjusts to both demand and price, increasing, for example, with demand only if the price is
higher than the equilibrium price. Figure 7 shows as example four relaxation trajectories for a
simple model realization of this concept.
In contrast, in assett or housing markets, increasing prices can lead to increasing rather than
decreasing demand, since buyers speculate that the value of the assett or house will increase
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Fig. 7. Adjustment of supply, demand and price to their equilibrium values according to standard
economic theory for four diﬀerent non-equlibrium initial values.
Fig. 8. Bubble and bust sequence produced by speculative anticipation of price developments.
still further in the future. The demand begins to ﬂatten out only when the price of the assett
or house has reached a very high level above its true value. At the point where the demand and
consequently the price begins to ﬂatten, the anticipation of future decreases in price transforms
the boom very rapidly into a bust. Figure 8 shows a simple model realization of the boom and
bust concept, simulated by an appropriate modiﬁcation of the feedbacks of Fig. 7.
The decarbonization of the present fossil-based global economic system will require major
redirections of global investment streams into renewable energy technologies. Many of these
investments will necessarily be associated with considerable risk, since the optimal future mix of
renewable energy technologies cannot be reliably predicted. It is therefore esential that realistic
models of the ﬁnancial system are included in coupled climate-socio-economic models used for
the assessment of climate policies, and that the inherent instabilities of the ﬁnancial system
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Fig. 9. Information ﬂow rates and political and technological responses (represented by integrating
box variables) that characterize the delay chain from the creation of scientiﬁc knowledge to the ﬁnal
reduction of global warming. Top sketch: without climate policy (business as usual, BAU); bottom
sketch: with climate policy.
are appropriately represented. This will require, of course, a more detailed analysis, including
government policies, than can be indicated in this brief overview.
6 From scientiﬁc analysis to mitigation of climate change
For a more complete understanding of the role of science in the assessment of climate policies,
we need to consider not only the many open questions regarding the impact of climate policies,
as discussed brieﬂy above, but also the many hindrances and delays encountered in the complete
chain of processes leading from the initial creation and dissemination of scientiﬁc knowledge
on the physics of the climate system to the ﬁnal outcome of mitigation policies. In addition
to the principal economic actors, this requires consideration of further actors involved in the
processes of communication of information and policy creation. Figure 9 represents an attempt
to capture these processes in a rudimentary manner using a strongly reduced but appropriately
augmented version of MADIAM.
The model consists of a complex delay chain, beginning with the ﬁrst comprehensive presen-
tation of climate-science knowledge through the creation of IPCC in 1990, followed immediately
by a contamination of this information by special interest groups opposed to climate change
policies, and disseminated (after the addition of further noise through the ampliﬁcation of
pseudo-scientiﬁc debates) by the media. These signals, despite the super-imposed noise, never-
theless stimulate ﬁrst climate policy concepts, which are then elaborated and implemented after
further delays, resulting ﬁnally in appropriate technological investments (Fig. 10a) to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions (Fig. 10b).
A distinction is made in Fig. 10a between investments in low-fruits renewable technologies
(wind and hydro power, biofuels, . . .) that can become competitive already through a carbon tax
or a cap-and-trade system (“stick” policies) and high-fruits technologies (e.g. concentrated solar
power) that require additional subsidies (“carrot” policies) to penetrate the market. The ﬁnal
global warming and associated economic growth paths for one particular (optimistic) scenario
are shown in Figs. 10d, 10c, together with the corresponding curves for the IPCC Business as
Usual (BAU) scenario.
The simulations highlight the delays incurred in the cascade from information transfer to
policy implementation, while conﬁrming the previous results of Weber et al. [27] and the Stern
report [24] that dangerous climate change can be avoided at only minor long-term cost.
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Fig. 10. Resultant evolution of low-fruits and high-fruits (solar) technologies (panel a), CO2 emissions
(panel b), global warming (panel d) and GDP (panel c) for the information-to-policy-implementation
delay chain of Fig. 9. Also shown in panels b, c and d are the corresponding curves for the reference
“Business as Usual” (BAU) scenario.
Inspection of the critical bottle-necks of Fig. 9 underline that science has an important role
to play, not only in generating an improved understanding of the inter-relation between climate
change and climate policy, but also in educating the public and policy makers on the inherent
delays built into the climate system. This mandates early action to prevent dangerous long-term
climate change – an imperative of climate policy that is not yet widely appreciated (cf. [22]).
7 Conclusions
In this necessarily brief overview of the role of science in relation to climate policies, the focus
has been on mitigation rather than adaptation. This is motivated in part by the consensus
that climate change mitigation is far less costly than adapting to unmitigated climate change.
However, some level of anthropogenic climate change (discernibly with us already today) is
unavoidable, so that adaptation measures are undoubtedly necessary. The main reason that
this issue was not addressed is that adaptation policies are necessarily reactive, rather than pro-
active. They thereby lack the critical time delay aspects, emphasized in the previous section,
which call for a stronger involvement of scientiﬁc analysis in climate policy assessments.
The IPCC has played a crucial role in bringing the problem of climate change to the at-
tention of the general public and policy makers. However, IPCC Working Group 3, concerned
with mitigation, has been far less inﬂuential than Working Group 1 on the science of climate
change. We attribute this to the traditional emphasis in macroeconomic modeling on general
equilibrium theory. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models fail to capture the essen-
tial dynamical processes, with their inherent time delays and potential instabilities, that govern
the transformation from a fossil-based to a decarbonized global socio-economic system. Needed
are simpler simulation models that focus on the key actor-dependent dynamics of the transition
process.
Economic theory in general is experiencing a paradigm shift from formal mathematical
analysis, in which general equilibrium concepts have played a central role, towards computer-
based simulation models that can more easily capture the many fruitful concepts developed in
the dynamical, actor-based mental models of classical economists. The paradigm shift is only
just beginning to penetrate the ﬁeld of integrated assessment of climate change, but can be
expected to have strong inﬂuence in the future also in this area.
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In view of the great complexity of the coupled global climate-socio-economic system, a single
model will never be able to simulate all aspects of the system dynamics. Needed is a hierarchy of
interrelated models that focus on diﬀerent, complementary properties of the complete system.
It is hoped that the overview given here of some possible components of such a model hierarchy
will stimulate similar eﬀorts by scientists contemplating on “What to do”.
This work has proﬁted considerably from many stimulating discussions with colleagues from the
European Climate Forum, whose contributions are gratefully acknowledged. The work has been par-
tially supported through the networking project “Global Systems Dynamics and Policies” within
the Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) programme of the Seventh Framework Programme for
Research of the European Commission, under the FET-Open grant agreement GSD, number 221955.
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